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vidual of a set of circumstances such as those which caused
defendant to kill appears
remote.
Not only do we mention the foregoing factors as reasonable
explanation of the selection of the extreme penalty by the
jury here; also we mention the various generally accepted
purposes of punishment as matters of which the jury might
appropriately be advised in connection with their selection
of penalty for first degree murder.
While at least some of us may doubt that this defendant
exemplifies the type of criminal who should be put to death
for his crimes, we find in the record no legal basis for concluding that the proceedings in the trial court were invalid or
that there was prejudicial error which caused a miscarriage
of justice.
For the reasons above stated, the judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
Spence, J., concurred in the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied February
27, 1957.

[L.A. No. 24232.

In Bank.

Jan. 30, 1957.]

AU'rO:M:OTRIZ DEL GOLFO DE CAijiFORNIA S. A. de
C. V., Respoude11t, v. ERWIN G. RESNICK et al., Appellants.
[1] Corporations- Foreign Corporations- Actions- Burden of
Proof.-The burden of proving that Corp. Code, § 6801, precludes maintenance of an action by a foreign corporation is
on the party pleading the bar of the statute.
[2] !d.-Foreign Corporations-Actions-Burden of Proof.-Defendants, sued for the price of automobiles sold them by a
foreign corporation, in order to prove that Corp. Code, § 6801
applies, must show that the particular transaction was an
·intrastate sale.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Corporations, § 902; [4] Corporations,§ 5; [5] Corporations,§ 6; [6, 8] Corporations,§ 8; [7] Corporations, § 5.
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[3] !d.-Foreign Corporations-Actions-Evidence.--In an action
a
for the balance due on the price of
automobiles sold to
the trial court was justified
in concluding that defendants
to meet the burden of
showing that the sale was an intrastate transaction where there
was evidence
with reference to
similar transactions,
the cars would be sent to Los
and the buyer would pay
the cost of
them from
where plaintiff
sometimes
cars to the "L.A. automobile auction" and
occasionally,
not sold there, its agent would offer them to
defendant, usually negotiating
telephone from Mexico, and
where plaintiff's sales representative testified that "it could
up" at such
be possible" that the cars in question were
auction.
[ 4] !d.-Disregard of Corporate Entity.-The conditions under
which a corporate
may be disregarded vary according
to the circumstances in Pach case.
[5] !d.-Disregard of Corporate Entity.-A corporate entity may
be disregarded where there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the
individuals no longer exist, and where, if the acts are treated
as those of the corporation alone, an inequitable result will
follow.
[6] !d.-Disregard of Corporate Entity-Evidence.--Failure to
issue stock or to apply at any time for a permit, although not
conclusive evidence, is an indication that defendants were
doing business as individuals.
[7] !d.-Disregard of Corporate Entity.-Inadequate capitalization
may be considered as a factor in determining whether the corporate entity should be disregarded.
[8] !d.-Disregard of Corporate Entity-Evidence.-In determining whether defendants should be allowed to escape personal
liability for the debts due plaintiff, the trinl court was entitled
to consider the failure to issue any stock or apply for permission to do so and the creation aud operation of a corporation with little or no capital, as well as all relevant facts concerning the manner in which the business was operated.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ijos
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Affirmed .
.Action by foreign corporation for balanec dnc on price of
automobiles sold to defendants. ,J
for plaintiff affirmed.
[ 4] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 8; Am.Jur., Corporations,
§§ 7, 8.
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Bernard & Jaffe and George W. Rochester for Appellants.
C. P. Von Herzen and Samuel L. Laidig as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Appellants.
Francis B. Cobb for Respondent.
GIBSON, C.
a Mexican corporation, brought
this action for the balance due on the price of eight automobiles
which it alleges were sold to defendants E. G. Resnick, W. D.
Cowan and R. vV. Cowan. The trial court found for plaintiff,
and defendants have appealed from the judgment.
Defendants contend first that plaintiff cannot maintain this
action bee,ause, they assert, the transaction was intrastate
and plaintiff did not allege or prove that it had qualified to
do business in California by complying with chapter 3 of the
Corporations Code. Section 6801 of the Corporations Code
provides in part: "A foreign corporation subject to the
provisions of Chapter 3 of this part which transacts intrastate
business in this State without complying therewith shall not
maintain any action or proceeding upon any intrastate business so transacted in any court of this State, commenced prior
to compliance with Chapter 3 until it has complied with
the provisions thereof, . . . ''
[1] 'rhe burden of proving that section 6801 precludes
maintenance of an action is upon the party pleading the bar
of the statute. (W. W. Kimball Co. v. Read, 43 Cal.App.
342, 346 [185 P. 192] ; see McMillan Process Co. v. Brown,
33 Cal.App.2d 279, 284 [91 P.2d 613] ; Indian Refining Co.,
Inc. v. Royal Oil Co., Inc., 102 Cal.App. 710, 716 [283 P. 856] .)
[2] Defendants, in order to prove that the statute applies,
were required to show that the particular transaction involved
here was an intrastate sale. [3] There is evidence that,
prior to the sale of the eight automobiles, several similar
transactions had been arranged by telephone between plaintiff
in Mexico and Resnick in Los Angeles. After agreement
on the price, the cars would be sent to I,os Angeles, and the
buyer would pay the cost of transporting them from Mexico.
Sales made in that manner were not intrastate transactions.
Plaintiff sometimes shipped ears to the "h A. automobile
auction,''
Oil oeeasion, if they were not sold there, its
agent would offer them to Resnick, usually negotiating by
telephone from Mexico. The only evidence as to how the
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was
alive that" it eonld
up" at the "h A.
of the re<~ord the trial
that defendants had
that the sale involved

be pos::;ible''
automobile anetion. '
court was
in
failed to meet the burden of
here was all intrasl ate transad ion.
Defendants next (·ontend that the evidenee is insuffieient
to support the trial court's finding that they were doing business as individuals. \Y e do not agree.
In September of 1932 llesnick and several other persons
formed Erbel, Inc., a Califomia corporation. After obtaining
releases from his associates of their interest in the corporation,
Hesnick arranged with IN. D. Cowan and his son, R. \V. Cowan,
to establish a car company. It was orally agreed that Resniek,
who was to manage the business, was to receive 50 per cent of
the "profits" and that each of the Cowans was to receive
25 per cent, and the three of them berame offieers and directors
of Erbel, Inc. 'rhe corporation mwer issued stock or applied
for a permit to issue stork, am1, although clef'endants testified
that they contributed $5,000 to the capital of Erbcl, Inc., the
court did not find that this was trne, and such a finding was
not compelled by the reeorcl. 'rhere is no evidence that any
bank aceount was ever maintained in the name of Erbel, Inc.,
but a checking aeeount was opened by defendants with the
Bank of America under the name "Erhel, Ine. dba Bi-Rite
Auto Sales."
The volume of sales from the automobile business eonducted
by defendants ran between $100,000 and $150,000 a month.
'l'he method used to finanee the purehase of cars which were
to be offered for sale ·was complex, but it is clear that the
funds required for this purpose ·were supplied by the Cowans
and not by the corporation. According to defendants, they
bought ears for resale with money furnished by the Cowans,
and title was held by the Cowans until a purchaser for a car
>vas found. The proeeeds of resale were apparently deposited
in the Bank of Ameriea aecount, and checks were drawn on
that aeeount by Resnick to reimburse the Cowans for the
money advanced. In this connection, the trial court found
that the Cowans made advances in the amount of $223,445
which were used by defendants to operate the business and
which were repaid in part from time to time.
Erbel, Inc. filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, listing
liabilities of $146,247.43 and assets whieh were subsequently
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and a half
$16,000.
proceedings, when it was
before initiation of the
apparent that the business was in financial difficulties, the
the automobile titles which
Cowans transferred to
they were then uvL.uH.t>;
Prior to
transactions with defendants,
plaintiff informed Hesnick that would not accept his check
or draft, and it
deal \vith him only after it was
assured that W. D. Cowan was "going into business" and
would be ''backing the business up.'' In previous transactions
plaintiff had been given checks drawn on the Bank of America
account, and the present action is based upon two checks which
were drawn by Hesnick on that account and later dishonored
by the bank.
[ 4] It is the general rule that the conditions under which
a corporate entity may be disregarded vary according to the
circumstances in each case. (See II. A. S. Loan Service, Inc. v.
McColgan, 21 Cal.2d 518, 523 [138 P.2d 391, 145 .A.L.R. 349];
Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal.2d 839, 846 [129 P.2d 390].) [5] It
has been stated that the tvvo requirements for application
of this doctrine are (1) that there be such unity of interest
and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist and (2) that, if the
acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, an inequitable result will follow. (Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal.2d 839, 846
[129 P.2d 390]; Watson v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 8 Cal.2d
61, 68 [63 P.2d 295] .)
[6] The failure to issue stock or to apply at any time for
a permit, although not conclusive evidence, is an indication
that defendants were doing business as individuals. (Geisenhoff v. Mabrey, 58 CaLI\.pp.2d 481 [137 P.2d 36]; see Marr v.
Postal Union Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal..App.2d 673 [105 P.2d 649).)
In the Marr case the court stated: ""While the fact standing
alone that a corporation remains inchoate without stockholders
or stock is not of itself determinative of an alter ego relationship upon its part, nevertheless it does indicate that such
corporation may exist merely to serve the interests of another
-a corporation or an individual.'' ( 40 Cal ..App.2d at p.
682.)
[7] .Another factor to be considered in determining
whether individuals dealing through a corporation should be
held personally responsible for the corporate obligations is
whether there was an attempt to provide adequate capitaliza-
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tion for the
In Ballantine on Corporations (rev.
ed., 1946), at pages
it is stated: ''If a corporation
is organized and carries on business without substantial capital
in such a way that the corporation is likely to have no sufficient assets available to meet its debts, it is inequitable that
shareholders should set up such a
organization to escape
personal liability. The attempt to do corporate business
without providing any sufiicient basis of financial responsibility to creditors is an abuse of the
and will
be ineffectual to
the shareholders from corporate debts.
It is coming to be
as the policy of the law that
shareholders should in good faith put at the risk of the
business unincumbered capital reasonably adequate for its
prospective liabilities. If the capital is illusory or trifling compared with the business to be done and the risks of loss, this
is a ground for denying the separate entity privilege.''
The rule that inadequate capitalization may be considered
as a factor in determining whether the corporate entity should
be disregarded was followed in Shea v. Lconis, 14 Cal.2d 666
[96 P.2d 332], where a lessee attempted to escape liability
for rent due under a lease by assigning his interest in the
lease to a corporation which was without other assets. The
court held that the owners of the corporate stock were liable
for the rental payments, pointing out that it is proper to
disregard corporate existence "where, as in the instant case,
the device adopted is . . . an attempt to avoid liability for
benefits enjoyed by means of taking the obligation in the name
of a specially organized corporation which has no assets."
In CaTlesimo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal.App.2d 482 [197 P.2d 167],
it was recognized that "the proper rule is that inadequate
financing, where such appears, is a factor, and an important
factor, in determining whether to remove the insulation to
stockholders normally created by the corporate method of
operation." (See also Moshc1· v. Salt River Valley WateT
Users' Assn., 39 Ariz. 567 [8 P.2d 1077]; Ballantine, CoTporations: "Disreoanling the Corpomte E11tity" as a Regttlatm·y P1·ocess (J 943) 31 Cal.L.Rev. 426, 427; Fuller, The
Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company
(1938) 51 Harv.hHev. 1373, 1381-1383; cf. Dixie Coal Min.
& Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 221 A.la. 331 [128 So. 799] .) Although defelHlallis l('siified that the sum of $0,000 beeame a
part of the eapita1 of the corporatim1, the trial court, as
we have seen, was llot compelled to aeeept that testimony
as being true. Moreover, even if the court believed defend-
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ants'
in this regard, it could have inferred that
$5,000 was an insufficient capital investment in view of the
volume of business conducted.
[8] In determining whether defendants should be allowed
to escape personal liability for the debts due plaintiff, the
trial court was entitled to consider the failure to issue any
stoek or
for
to do so and the ereation and
operation of Erbel,
with little or no capital, as well as
all relevant facts concerning the manner in which the business
was operated.
There is ample support in the record for the finding of the
trial court that defendants were doing business as individuals.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Traynor, ,J., Schauer, ,J., Spence, .T., and McComb,
eoncurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
As I read the majority opinion, it holds that the corporate
entity may be disregarded where the corporation has not
issued any stoek and is undercapitalized.
As to the first point, it is difficult to see how there can be
a liability imposed upon the stockholders for an obligation
of the corporation when there are no stockholders to hold
liable. The theory of piercing the corporate veil is based on
the concept that the shareholders of the corporation are liable
although the obligation was ostensibly incurred by the corporation because on one basis or another the shareholders and
corporation will not be distinguished; the separation of the
corporate entity from its stockholders will not be observed.
This is to be distinguished from the case such as may exist
here where the individuals interested in the corporation are,
rather than the corporation, the ones who incurred the obligation or the obligation was incurred by both. In the instant
case it is true that no stock was issued nor was a permit for
issuance obtained from the Corporation Commissioner, yet the
evidence is undisputed that it was agreed that defendant
Resnick would own half the corporation and the Cowans the
other half and the business was just getting started. With
such facts present it is difficult to sec why the mere failure
to issue stock could be a fa(,tor in determining whether the
corporate entity should be disregard(•(1. Tn GeisenJwff v.
Mabrey, 58 CaJ.App.2d 481 [J 37 P.2d 36], relied upon by the
majority, the trial court had found that the persons who
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formed the
venturers
and as sueh incurred the
the name of the eorporation. That ease seems to hold that individual
may
not be escaped by the formation of a corporation unless and
until stock is issued. No authority is cited for that proposition
and I find none which supports it. It would indeed be a novel
theory in eorporation law. As said on the subject by the
District Court of Appeal in this ease: "\Vhile the Corporations Code authorizes corporate directors to organize by the
election of officers, yet, they may in the name of and in behalf
of the corporation apply for a permit to issue its shares.
Corporation Code, sections 25154, 25153. However, these
sections do not prohibit the transaction of corporate business
or the performance of any act by the corporation other than
the issue or sale of securities. Prior to the enactment of the
last cited sections, the courts had held that a partnership is not
necessarily the result of an abortive attempt to organize a
corporation or of a mere failure to issue corporate shares.
Blanchard v. Kanll, 44 Cal. 440, 451; 1. W. Williams Co. v.
Leong Stte Ah Qnin, 44 Cal.App. 296, 298 [186 P. 401]. The
idea that the organizers of a corporation vi·ould be penalized
in any way for the transaction of corporate business prior to
the issuance of its stock does not appear to have occurred to
the authors of section 25154. The only penalties to accrue
against directors with reference to the issuance of shares are
those which result from the enforcement of the statutes for
violations of the Corporate Securities Aet. Corporation Code,
section 25000 et seq. It makes felonious many aets of corporate officers in attempting to issue their company's securities
without first having obtained a permit so to do. But nowhere
is it there suggested that a eorporation is emasculated by
virtue of its failure to procure a permit to issue its shares.
Nor is there any authority for holding that the failure of
directors to obtain a permit makes of them a copartnership
or a joint adventure except the Geisenhoff decision, supra,
which imposed a sanction without legislative authorization.
On the contrary, the point was before this court in Vogel v.
Banker·s Bldg. Corp., 112 Cal.App.2d 160, 168 [245 P.2d
1069]. It was there held in effect that non-issuance of stock
does not as a matter of law fasten upon promoters the status
of joint adventurers; that the creation of that relationship
depends upon the intent of the parties." (A1domotriz del
Golfo de California v. Resnick (Cal.App.), 297 P.2d 109, 114.)
The other factor relied upon by the majority is no more
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is an indieation that the
should be disregarded. Precisely what is meant by undercapitalization is not explained.
The mere structure of the capital stock is not important. For
the idea to be
it must refer to the assets of the
financial standing. But the majority opinion
mentions the "
stock" authorization of $5,000 and
compares that with a business of $100,000 to $150,000 per
month. However, as stated in the majority opinion, the
Cowans were
money to operate the business and as
far as appears that was advanced to the corporation as its
asset. The monthly business was gross sales and thus there
was sufficient income to handle the business; that monthly income did not result in an expense or incurrence of obligations
by the corporation. In fact, there is no evidence which reflects
the financial status of the corporation other than its authorized
capital stock which is no criterion of its financial health.
Hence it follows that it was not shown that the assets were so
inadequate that the corporate entity must be disregarded even
if we assume that its financial worth is a factor in determining
whether the entity is to be disregarded. Moreover, that assumption is of very doubtful validity because otherwise only
well financed corporations may maintain their entity. In
fact it may be said that every corporation which fails because
it is unable to pay its obligations is underfinanced, but certainly that should not be a test of whether the entity should
be disregarded. In a rapidly changing economy what might
seem to be adequate financing today would be inadequate
tomorrow, and it should be obvious that risky business ventures
could not be undertaken by use of the corporate device without subjecting the participants to personal liability. I know
of no such rule. What may appear hazardous by hindsight
may not seem so at the outset. If the corporate entity may
be disregarded in a case such as this it will not be safe for
anyone to use the corporate device for the promotion of a
business enterprise even though he acts in the utmost good
faith and pursues a course of unquestionable fair dealing.
In my opinion there is no factual basis here to justify
piercing the corporate veil and disregarding the corporate
entity. To justify such holding it should be made to appear
that the corporate entity was employed as a mere shield for
the purpose of evading obligations incurred for the benefit of
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those
created the
showing 1s
made here.
v'or the
reasons, I would reverse the judgment.
\Yas dvni<'cl

a

of the opinion that tlH' petition

should be
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WILLIAM A. KEELE!\, .Appellant, v. IWTH SCHULTE
et al., Respondents.
[1] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation

-Parties.-A corporation is an indispensable party to a
representative action brought on its behalf; its rights, not
those of the nominal plaintiff, are to be litigated, and the court
has no jurisdiction to adjudicate its rights in its absence as a
party.
[2a, 2b] Appeal-Law of Case-Questions Concluded.-The propriety of prosecuting an action involving the validity of a
deed and transfers of property belonging to a lodge corporation
of a theosophical society without including the lodge as a
party was not adjudicated on a former appeal so as to
preclude a determination of such issue on a subsequent appeal,
where the former opinion did not discuss the lodge's pleaded
status as a corporation, the continuance of its corporate existence and legal rights under California law despite any purported dissolution and surrender of its charter according to
theosophical law, and its absence as a party to the action.
[3] Corporations-Dissolution.-A California corporation can only
be dissolved in the manner and under the conditions prescribed
in Corp. Code, §§ 4600-4692, and the withdrawal of a corporation's charter under ecclesiastical rules of law and order will
not work a corporate dissolution in disregard of such state
law.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 222; Am.Jur., Corporations,
§ 466.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 444 et seq.; Am.Jur., Corporations, § 1285 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Corporations,§ 363; [2] Appeal and
Error,§ 1350; [3] Corporations,§ 821.
47 C.2d-26

